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Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and Mari Lee Mifsud

WEDGE AND BRIDGE:A NOTE ON RHETORICAS DISTINCTION
AND AS IDENTIFICATION

Henry Johnstone(1970 p. 124, 1990) has advancedthe slogan "Rhetoricis a
wedge" to suggest the ways in which rhetoric calls attentionto hitherto
unnoticedconsequencesor assumptions,or even to featuresof the physical world
thathave escaped an audience'sattention.Here, however, we intend to supplementthe notion of rhetoricas "wedge"by suggestingthe ways in which it is, and
also must be, a "bridge."'
Technically,we could say thatthe two functionsof rhetorichere underconsiderationare distinctionand identification.We distinguishideas thatwe may have
tendedto confuse, anddistinguishfromthe backgroundthe stimuliwe shouldbe
attending to. We identify diverse elements of the social landscape, including
ourselves, with a cause or projectrequiring,or at least inviting, solidarity.Some
examples shortly.But first it is importantto declare that we authorsmake no
attemptto define "rhetoric."We only appealto an intuitionof what it is thatcan
be the instrumentof eitherdistinctionor identification.It would not be strangeif
persuasionhad somethingto do with it.
Let us returnto the rhetoricof identification.Since this was not discussed in
(1990), we ought to try to say enough about it now. But we mean to provide
only the barestsketch. It is by no means a full study we are attemptinghere.
Among the performancesof the rhetoricof identification,the most pervasive
is clearly thatwhich is susceptibleto being dismissedas "mererhetoric."Speech
of this kindrangesfrompoliticalutterancesperceivedas radicallybiased through
pep rallies and other partisangatheringsthat might be aptly characterizedas
"bacchanalian."Throughits revelry and indulgence, this rhetoricfixes both the
speakerand audience on the particularworth of an action, idea, event, person,
etc. in such a way thatthe possibility of alternativeperspectivesis never brought
to consciousness. Mere rhetoricis thereforenot a wedge. But it is not quite a
bridge either.The judgmentrequiredto discern and associate ideals of virtueis
bypassed in mere rhetoric.That which moves the psyche along is more akin to
compulsion thanjudgment. Furthermore,such rhetoricbypasses different perspectives, ratherthan overcomes them. "To overcome" suggests direct experience with opposition, while "to bypass" connotes indirection,or avoidance of
opposition, throughsuch tactics as silence or raising misdirectedissues against
opposition, what some might call trickery.
Anotherperformanceof identificationis the rhetoricclassed as "epideictic."
While epideictic has certainly been held in suspicion because of its tendency
(throughouthistory) to display oratoricalexcellence, ratherthan public excellence, we are not forced to be suspicious. We can for instance envision a less
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suspect functionof epideictic which would entail seeing the ways in which culturalexcellence comes to be identified.GerardHauser(1998) has most recently
put voice to such a vision by exploring epideictic as didactic, as a teacher of
public excellence through the display of public models of virtue. Didactic
epideictic provides a common groundof public virtuefrom which deliberative
and forensic argumentationcan proceed.
To say thatepideictic is didacticsuggests it is both a wedge and a bridge.As a
wedge, epideictic opens audiencesto the ideal of virtuousbehavior.As a bridge
it connects an audience's consciousness of virtuosity with a model of public
virtue. It bridges the self with the virtuousother.
We can look to the commonrhetoricaltechniques(koina), in additionto rhetoricalgenres, for anotheroperationof identification.Takefor example, the rhetoricaltechniquewhichAristotlecalls amplification(auxesis),which he describes
as generally applicableto all three types of speech but particularlywell suited
for epideictic (1368a).3Amplificationtakesas its subjectthe undisputed.It draws
from a common pool of readily available and agreedupon beliefs, values, and
understandings.As Aristotledescribes,when a particularconsciousness is in an
audience already,all that remains to be done by the rhetor is to attributeto it
greaterbeauty and importance,in other words to celebrate this consciousness
(1368a). While this celebrationis not a wedge, since it calls attentionto nothing
the audiencedid not alreadybelieve, it is a bridge.It is an appealto the identification of "like"consciousness. Only when this identificationdescends into an
ecstasy beyond reasondoes it degeneratefrombridgeto bypass, fromrhetoricto
mere rhetoric.
If amplificationoperatesas a generaltechniquewithinall threegenresof rhetoric, andif it is a way of bridging,then the bridgeas a metaphorfor identification
is applicableto all three genres,not just epideicticbut deliberativeand forensic
address.Rhetoricworks as a wedge in deliberativeand forensic speech primarily to open an audience'sawarenessto the existence of a particularproblemthat
needs attending.But the evocation of this awarenessis only the beginning of
what might be describedas a tripartiterhetoricaltransaction.Beginning with a
problem, deliberativeand forensic rhetoricproceeds throughdeliberationto a
decision. It is the thirdterm which requires"rhetoricas a wedge" to be supplemented with "rhetoricas a bridge."The wedge alone cannotbring the rhetorical
process to its necessary end of judgment.
This is the case whetherwe are speakingof the more traditionalAristotelian
referentof publicaddress,orwhetherwe arespeakingof a performanceof identification beyond this, such as the reflexive rhetoricwhich both of us have explored (Johnstone1970, 1990; Mifsud 1998). Reflexive rhetoric,whererhetorical transactionsparticularlyof a deliberativekind are internalizedwithin one
individual, finds an individualtorn asunderby the recognition of a particular
problemandthe alternativeways of solving the problem.If rhetoriconly wedges,
the sunderedself will collapse into schizophrenia.The end of reflexive delibera-
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tive rhetoric is to bridge the poles of the divided mind, re-creatinga unity of
mind manifest in a personaldecision.
While we could continuedelineatingexamples of "rhetoricas a bridge,"this
is not the task of this note. Ratherwe hope these exampleshelp to show the need
for supplementingthe slogan 'rhetoricas a wedge.' A properlyrhetoricaltransaction must both wedge and bridge. What begins as an opening of consciousness must end in judgmentin orderfor a rhetoricaltransactionto reachits telos.
While one might say thatthe coming of awarenessof a particularproblem(as in
the case of most deliberativeand forensic rhetoric)or a particularideal of virtue
(as in epideictic rhetoric)is a rhetoricalmoment,it is not the telos but the arche'
of the rhetoricaltransaction.For the transactionto be completed it must move
from awarenessto judgment.The metaphorof the rhetoricalwedge governs the
former event while the rhetoricalbridge governs the latter.If rhetoricwedges
without bridging,no judgmentcan be realized and the rhetoricaltransactionis
incomplete.And if rhetoricbridgeswithoutwedging it becomes bacchanalianin
nature.Rhetoricpresupposesboth the wedge andthe bridge-the two cannotbe
separatedrightly.
The PennsylvaniaState University
The Universityof Richmond
Notes
'In his first advancementof the idea 'rhetoricas a wedge', Johnstone also made
use of the word 'bridge.'Ourpresentuse of 'bridge'is not precisely the use to which the
bridge metaphorwas put in the relevantpassage of TheProblemof the Self. But it is too
much to ask that metaphorsbe precise. That is the office of technical terms, the relevant
ones of which are now aboutto be introduced.
2Fora noteworthypredecessorto the subject of this note see, Kenneth Burke, A
Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1969), 38-39.
'Amplification is best understoodas a koinon, something that is common to all
species of rhetoric.It is a techniqueof persuasionlike example andenthymeme.All three
techniques are koina, but each has its place where it is most at home: amplificationin
epideictic speeches, example in deliberative speeches, and enthymemes in judicial
speeches. See Aristotle's qualificationof amplificationas koinon at 1403a. For further
explanation,see Kennedy (1991), n. 181, 267.
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